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REVIEW OF ISSUES

IN AMENDING THE

CANADA PENSION PLAN





Ministry of Treasury, Economics and Intergovernmental Affairs

November, 1972



PREFACE

This paper is one of two being forwarded to all governments participating in the Canada Pension Plan as part of Ontario's contribution to the review of the Plan. The other document, PENSIM:

Canada Pension Plan Simulation Model, describes the operation of a computer model which simulates the Canada Pension Plan. This report contains a preliminary review of the issues.

The paper is not an expression of an "Ontario position".

It simply attempts to make an initial contribution to an understanding, from the provincial point of view, of the general issues which are involved in amending the Canada Pension Plan. Our view is that discussion of the complex details of the Canada Pension Plan should be preceded by a thorough review of the basic issues. Therefore the amendment process should relate the Canada Pension Plan to a broad spectrum of income security objectives, programs and provincial financial needs.

It is hoped that this document, and the PENSIM report, will add to the elements which are essential to a comprehensive review of the Canada Pension Plan, that is, a thorough definition of the issues and a capacity to develop and test a range of alternative policies.

The Honourable Charles MacNaughton, Treasurer of Ontario and Minister of Economics and Intergovernmental Affairs. H. I. Macdonald,
Deputy Minister,
Ministry of Treasury, Economics
and Intergovernmental Affairs.

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I SUMMARY

The federal government has proposed to amend the Canada Pension Plan, as outlined in its white paper on income security. Amendment of the Plan requires the consent of two-thirds of the participating provinces representing two-thirds of the participating population. The process of amendment, therefore, will require extensive federal-provincial consultation.

The Canada Pension Plan is a highly complex and centrally important program in the field of Canadian income security and social insurance. It has also proved to be a vital instrument for the provision of social capital to Canadian society through its provisions for provincial borrowing from the investment fund. Therefore, changes in the Plan should be carefully analysed and assessed from the provincial point of view.

The increases in retirement benefits are proposed by the federal government in order to realign benefits with wage and price increases over the past six years. However, the basic thrust of the proposed federal amendments is to substantially increase widows' and disability benefits. Enrichment of these benefits partially shifts the focus of the Plan away from the retirement area.

The federal proposals, when examined within the context of recent increases in Guaranteed Income Supplement and Old Age Security benefits, indicate an increasing reliance on a guaranteed income approach in which the Canada Pension Plan plays a supplementary role. For example, even with increased retirement benefits under the proposals, there will not be a large differential between CPP and GIS income levels.

^{1.} Hon. John Munro, Income Security for Canadians (Ottawa: Department of National Health and Welfare, 1970).



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It is the Ontario view that these proposals should be considered within the context of a comprehensive review of the long-run social insurance and income security objectives and the roles of federal and provincial programs in achieving those objectives. Concurrent with these general concerns there are also a number of specific issues which should be settled, such as the earnings test and the question of adjusting benefits in line with cost-of-living changes.

Since 1966 the Canada Pension Plan investment fund has accumulated much faster than originally anticipated such that the current size of the fund exceeds the initial estimates by over \$1 billion.

Virtually all of the available capital has been borrowed by the provinces. The federal government proposes to finance higher benefits by an increase in contributions through an increase in the earnings ceiling and a decrease in the rate of buildup in the investment fund.

Moderate inflation projections indicate that the fund will be \$7 billion lower in 1990 if the proposals are adopted.

Amendments to the Canada Pension Plan should also be evaluated in terms of their long-run relationship to provincial finances. Under existing arrangements the investment fund would reach its peak in 2008 at \$48.4 billion. Adoption of all federal proposals would advance the peak year to 1993 at \$23.3 billion. It is also important to note that under the proposed plan, provincial interest payments alone will exceed new capital funds available by 1982.

In July 1972 the Quebec Government passed an act to amend the Quebec Pension Plan as of January 1, 1973. These amendments do not parallel the federal proposals. The financial implications of adopting the Quebec amendments for the Canada Pension Plan are similar to those of the federal proposals.



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II BACKGROUND

The Canada Pension Plan (CPP) began operating on January 1, 1966 as a social insurance program in which both benefits and contributions would be primarily related to the lifetime earnings of the contributor. The basic objectives of the Plan were to:

- guarantee an income-related pension to every member of the labour force;
- provide basic social insurance to each labour force member and direct dependants in the event of death or total disability;
- . provide a source of capital to the provinces.

Although the CPP is commonly thought of as a pure social insurance program, it contains important provisions, such as non-earnings-related benefits, which also give it the characteristics of a social welfare plan.

Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) payments began in 1967, the same year in which CPP benefits commenced. The GIS was initially intended as a temporary program, to be phased out when the Canada Pension Plan matured in 1976. At present, 945,000 persons are receiving GIS payments and 241,000 are receiving CPP retirement benefits. 2

In its 1970 white paper on income security, the federal government proposed to establish the GIS as a permanent program, to continue universal Old Age Security (OAS) payments, and to amend the Canada Pension Plan. The proposed CPP amendments are basically designed to meet two problems as seen by the white paper.

- 1. Gaps remain in the income security system, particularly for widows and disabled people.
- CPP contributions and benefits have not kept pace with the growth in average Canadian wages.

^{1.} Hon. John Munro, Income Security for Canadians, p. 41.

^{2.} In addition, 143,000 persons receive survivor and disability benefits.



The basic direction of the proposed CPP amendments is to substantially increase widows' and disability benefits and to increase retirement benefits and contributions through a series of selective increases in the earnings ceiling (Year's Maximum Pensionable Earnings -- YMPE).

CPP BENEFITS BEGINNING IN 1976

(Annual Maximum)

	Current Plan \$	Proposed Plan	Increase %
Retirement pension	1,467	1,925	31
Total Disability pension	1,459	2,944	102
Widow's pension	909	2,463	171

^{*} Based on moderate inflation assumptions (see footnote 1).

^{1.} Unless otherwise indicated, all further tables in this report are based on the "moderate inflation" assumptions used in the Department of Insurance, Canada Pension Plan Actuarial Report (Ottawa: December 31, 1969). The growth rate assumptions are:

	1970	1971	1972		1974	1975+
- Increase in Average Earnings	6.5	6.3	6.1	5.9	5.7	5.5
- Increase in Consumer Price Index	4.0	3.8	3.6	3.4	3.2	3.0
- Annual Interest Rate on New Investments	8.0	7.7	7.4	7.1	6.8	6.5

These figures are used to maintain compatibility with the federal Actuarial Report even though actual figures are available for the years 1970 and 1971. Subsequent Ontario PENSIM analysis will incorporate recent changes in these indicators.



In its 1972 spring budget, the federal government enriched the Old Age Security and Guaranteed Income Supplement programs by increasing combined maximum payments by \$15 per month and making provision for future adjustments in line with changes in the Consumer Price Index. These programs now guarantee an income to senior citizens which closely approximates the Economic Council's suggested poverty line. 1

MAJOR PUBLIC SECTOR ELDERLY INCOME SUPPORT PROGRAMS AND POVERTY LEVELS, 1972

	OAS-GIS (Guaranteed Income)	OAS-CPP (maximum)	Poverty Line*
	\$	\$	\$
Married	3,420	2,799	3,456
Single	1,800	1,805	2,074

^{*} Based on Economic Council of Canada 1969 poverty line escalated by Consumer Price Index to 1972.

^{1.} Report of the Special Senate Committee on Poverty, Poverty in Canada (Ottawa, 1971), p.8.



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III ROLE OF THE CANADA PENSION PLAN

The Canada Pension Plan is one of a number of programs which relate exclusively or primarily to elderly people. These programs have reached massive financial proportions. In Canada, federal spending in 1972-73 on the GIS and OAS programs alone will amount to \$2.3 billion. In addition, the provinces incur large additional expenditures in such areas as institutional and health care, public housing, welfare and property tax relief. The federal government contributes financially to some of these programs through various shared cost programs.

The Canada Pension Plan can, therefore, be seen as one of a number of programs which provide income, service and assistance to elderly people. It follows that amendments to the Canada Pension Plan should take into account the amount and type of benefits available from other programs to ensure a consistent overall social policy for the elderly.

The federal white paper, however, does not articulate a clear role for the Canada Pension Plan within the context of overall income security policy. It simply proposes to enrich benefits and alter the emphasis of the Plan from retirement to supplementary benefits for widows, the totally disabled and their dependants. The recent increases in OAS-GIS benefits reinforce the apparent de-emphasis on CPP retirement benefits.

As mentioned above, the Canada Pension Plan combines insurance and social welfare characteristics. The term "social insurance" generally characterizes aspects of the Plan which do not involve internal subsidies and which are roughly parallel to private sector operations. The term "welfare" describes operations of the Plan which involve subsidies and parallel in other ways public

^{1.} Hon. John Turner, Supplementary Information on the Budget (Ottawa: Department of Finance, May 8, 1972), p.5.



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sector income support programs. Major insurance-related aspects of the Plan are:

- contributions and a substantial proportion of benefits are based on contributor earnings;
- . contributions are made through special payments and are deductible from taxable income;
- the Plan operates through a fund which makes investments and earns interest;
- . most benefits are not related to the current need or income of the beneficiary.

Social welfare aspects of the Plan are:

- . retirement benefits between ages 65 and 69 are
 offset through an earnings test;
- internal subsidies occur through flat-rate benefit payments which are not related to contributions and through pension payments to those who contributed over a brief number of years;
- . pensions are increased through a "drop-out" provision in the calculation;
- . generally the value of benefits is greater than the value of contributions made.

Basically, policies for change in the CPP can emphasize certain welfare or insurance aspects of the Plan, depending on the overall income security objectives as they relate to particular target groups and the role of the Plan within these objectives. Under the federal proposals, both aspects of the Plan would be extended with more emphasis on the welfare side.

The rest of this section reviews the two major benefit streams of the CPP in relation to general income security policy.

Retirement Benefits

In order to compare income security programs for the elderly, it is useful to identify the major target groups which are served by these programs. These groups are identified below on the basis of individual reliance on public sector income support.



1. The Independent

People in this group provide for their own retirement needs.

Normally they do this by contributing to a private pension

plan, by purchasing a retirement savings plan or through

other forms of saving which produce a retirement income.

Their capacity to save is created through income gained by

long participation in the labour force and/or possession of

independent means.

2. The Semi-Independent

This group includes people who for various reasons do not adequately save for their retirement. These people are part of the labour force during their adult years but may experience high job mobility, periods of unemployment, generally low income or lack of opportunity to participate in private plans.

3. The Dependent

This category includes those who never become part of the labour force for any significant length of time, generally because of disability. At age 65, they are more or less totally dependent on the public sector for support.

The Canada Pension Plan was designed to provide for people in the first two groups. It provides an earnings-related income for the financially independent to which their private retirement income is added. People in the second group have an opportunity, which they would not otherwise have, to earn the right to a basic retirement income. The Guaranteed Income Supplement was basically designed to support people in the second group until the Canada Pension Plan matured. Since the GIS was introduced as a temporary program, the implicit objective was presumably that the third group of people would be eventually covered only by Old Age Security and social assistance.



In broad terms, there are two approaches which can be adopted in providing for the three target groups - a guaranteed income approach or a selective approach.

Under a pure guaranteed income concept, those who do not or cannot provide for their own needs, for whatever reason, are supported through a guaranteed annual income. Within the context of present programs, this would be provided by OAS and GIS payments which guarantee at least a poverty line income.

The Canada Pension Plan plays an intermediate role in this approach by replacing for some people part of the guaranteed income stream so that a portion of retirement income is "earned". However, CPP income would not be significantly greater than the income which a person would receive from other programs had he never contributed to the Plan.

A <u>selective approach</u> would create a basic distinction in the treatment of pensioners who find themselves primarily dependent on the public sector for income support, i.e. groups two and three. An earnings-related plan would exist for those who, through their working lifetime, were able to generate savings but for various reasons did not or could not participate in private pension plans. Those with limited or sporadic attachment to the labour force would receive a guaranteed minimum income.

Under the selective approach, the Canada Pension Plan would have a stronger independent role as a retirement income insurance scheme geared to providing earnings-related benefits. In order to encourage long-term participation in the labour force and to minimize the number of people who receive welfare-type payments, benefits would be set at a significantly higher level than those provided by the GIS.



In its white paper proposals and recent changes in the OAS-GIS program, the federal government has essentially adepted a guaranteed income approach. OAS-CPP income levels alone will not be significantly higher than the guaranteed minimum income and some CPP recipients will receive GIS benefits, even though they are eligible for maximum CPP pension levels. This would apply even with the enrichment of benefits proposed by the white paper as indicated in the following table.

OAS-GIS INCOME AND PROPOSED CPP RETIREMENT BENEFITS IN 1976

		Maximum CPP pension		
	Guaranteed OAS-GIS Income	OAS-CPP Pension	GIS Add-on	Total \$
Single Married*	2,050 3,894	3,057 4,190	0 1,149	3,057 5,339
		Three-qua	arters CPP pen	sion
Single Married*	2,050 3,894	2,576 3,709	195 1,269	2,771 4,978
		One-ha	alf CPP pension	on
Single Married*	2,050 3,894	2,095 3,227	436 1,389	2,531 4,616

^{*} Married couples -- both 65 with one contributor to CPP.

As indicated in the above table, the combination of OAS and CPP benefits will not be significantly greater and in some cases it will be lower than the guaranteed income level. For example, a married couple entitled to full CPP benefits in 1976 will have a CPP-OAS income which is only \$296 above the poverty line. They would still be entitled to \$1,149 in GIS benefits. Thus, although better off under CPP, many people will not receive significantly greater incomes than those who never contributed to the Canada Pension Plan, and their income will still be supplemented by GIS payments.



The interrelationship between Canada Pension Plan and GIS benefits can be further illustrated by comparing benefit levels under the existing and proposed CPP schemes. For people retiring within the next ten years, some advantages will be gained from the proposed increase in CPP retirement pensions. However, if the Canada Pension Plan were not amended, many would receive a portion of what they did not gain under CPP through GIS payments, particularly in light of the GIS increases announced in the federal budget of May 8, 1972.

EXISTING AND PROPOSED MAXIMUM CPP BENEFITS

		7	9 7 6	
	CPP	OAS	CIS	Total
	\$	\$	\$	\$
Single				
Existing Proposed	1,467 1,925	1,132 1,132	184	2,783
	± 9 /	1,102	O	3,057
Married*				
Existing	1,467	2,265	1,269	5,001
Proposed	1,925	2,265	1,149	5,339
		1 :	980	
Single				- The second
Existing	1,825	1,275	119	3,219
Proposed	2,458	1,275	0	3,733
Married*				
Existing	1,825	2,549	1,378	5,752
Proposed	2,458	2,549	1,222	6,229
			an dankarja sanaguna musa pakabah sapanga bahak sanaguna panga bahak	egi-ri-dilamaja sarakumajasirup -arakumpijasa pa sarakumpijasa pa

^{*} Married couples -- both 65 with one contributor to CPP.



Supplementary Benefits

A major objective of the white paper proposals is to increase existing disability and survivor benefits under the Canada Pension Plan in order to fill what the white paper cites as a major gap in the Canadian income security system. The following table compares annual benefits under the current and proposed systems for the year 1976.

ANNUAL MAXIMUM SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFITS UNDER CURRENT AND PROPOSED PLANS IN 1976

	Current Plan \$	Proposed Plan \$	Increase %
Disability Disabled Contributor Wife of Disabled Child of Disabled	1,459	2,944	102
	-	1,019	n.a.
	359	359	0
Survivor Widow Invalid Widower Orphan Death Benefit (lump sum)	909	2,463	171
	909	2,463	171
	359	359	0
	610	820	34

In the case of both widows' and disability pensions, the flat-rate benefit portion would be raised from \$28.15 to \$80 per month, in order to achieve compatibility with Old Age Security payments.

The earnings-related component would be increased from 75 to 100 per cent of the retirement pension in the case of total disability, and from 37.5 to 75 per cent for widows' pensions. No changes have been proposed to cover the survivors of married female contributors, with the exception of invalid widowers.

This feature was designed to achieve compatibility with pre-April 1972 OAS benefits. Since OAS will now be inflated in accordance with changes in the Consumer Price Index, further modifications will be needed if total compatibility is to be maintained.



These changes reflect an extension of both the insurance and welfare characteristics of the Plan; the former through the increase in earnings-related benefits and the latter through the increase in the flat-rate benefits. The increase in flat-rate benefits to \$80 per month will create, in a sense, the partial equivalent of an Old Age Security program for widows and disabled people, who either contributed or had a spouse who contributed to the Canada Pension Plan.

These proposals for supplementary CPP benefits should be reviewed in relation to longer term objectives with respect to people who are generally not part of the labour force, the impact on provincial social assistance programs, and alternative possibilities for delivering equivalent benefits.



IV FINANCING OF CPP BENEFITS

The impact of any amendments on the future buildup of the Canada Pension Plan fund is of vital concern to all participating provinces. This fund has become a very important source of provincial capital and will likely continue to be so in the future.

Canada Pension Plan revenues are derived from employee and employer contributions. Payments equal 3.6 per cent of gross income, up to an earnings ceiling called the Year's Maximum Pensionable Earnings (YMPE). Since the inception of the Plan, contributions have far outstripped benefits, resulting in a much greater buildup of the investment fund than was originally anticipated. At the end of 1971, the fund stood at \$4.4 billion, some \$1.5 billion higher than the original estimate. The 1964 estimates were low because population growth and wage increases were underestimated, and interest rate projections were too low.

CANADA PENSION PLAN INVESTMENT FUND, CALENDAR YEAR BASIS 1966-71

(\$ million)

	1964 Projection	Actual Fund
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970	423 900 1,399 1,925 2,461 2,979	463 1,135 1,846 2,654 3,522 4,444

Source: Department of National Health and Welfare, Canada Pension Plan Branch; and Department of Insurance, The Canada Pension Plan Actuarial Report (Ottawa, 1964).



Initially, it was anticipated that the break-even point for the CPP fund (the point where expenses exceed revenues) would occur in the mid-1980's. Revised projections for the existing plan show that the fund would continue to grow beyond the year 2000.

As outlined in the previous section, the federal proposals involve increases in both retirement and supplementary benefits.

However, the contribution rate will not be increased; instead, individual contributions to the Plan will rise because of the higher YMPE.

The following table compares projected benefit and contribution streams to the year 2000 under the existing and proposed provisions. 1

PENSIM PROJECTIONS OF CPP BENEFITS AND CONTRIBUTIONS (\$ billion)

	Benefits a	nd Expenses	Contributions							
Year	Current	Proposed	Current	Proposed						
	Plan	Plan	Plan	Plan						
1972	0.3	0.3	0.9	.0.9						
1973	0.3	0.5	0.9	1.0						
1974	0.4	0.6	1.0	1.1						
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979	0.5 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9	0.7 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4	1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4	1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6						
1980	1.2	1.8	1.4	1.9						
1985	2.0	3.1	2.2	2.8						
1990	3.3	4.9	3.0	4.0						
1995	5.1	7.4	4.2	5.6						
2000	7.4	10.7	5.8	7.9						

An increase in the YMPE has the effect of increasing contributions for all contributors whose gross income is greater than the original YMPE. Under the existing plan, the YMPE would rise from \$5,600 in 1973 to \$5,800 in 1975. With the amendments, it would increase from \$6,300 in 1973 to \$7,800 in 1975.

^{1.} Ministry of Treasury, Economics and Intergovernmental Affairs, PENSIM: Canada Pension Plan Simulation Model (Toronto, September, 1972).



As indicated in the previous table, the proposed increases in benefits are not completely financed by the higher volume of contributions. The balance of the financing would occur through a decrease in the rate of buildup in the investment fund. For example, by 1995 the fund under the existing plan is projected at \$36.6 billion and would be exhausted in 2020. Under the proposals it would stand at \$22.9 billion in 1995 and would run down to zero by 2007.

PENSIM FUND PROJECTIONS (\$ billion)

Year	Current Plan	Proposed Plan
Brownight - Latter California - Andrews - Andr		
1972	5.3	5.3
1973	6.3	6.2
1974	7.4	7.2
1975	8.4	8.3
1976	9.6	9.4
1977	10.8	10.6
1978	12.0	11.7
1979	13.3	12.9
1980	14.5	13.9
1985	21.3	18.8
1990	29.2	22.6
1995	36.6	22.9
2000	42.7	17.5
2005	47.3	5.9
2007	48.2	0

Provincial Financing Needs

All revenues of the CPP fund, minus benefits and expenses of administration, are available for loans to the participating provinces. Each province is entitled to an amount proportional to its share of total contributions during the previous 10 years and residual amounts may be borrowed by the federal government. The loans carry 20-year maturities and bear interest rates equivalent to those offered on long-term Government of Canada bonds. The loans are callable by the Minister of Finance on 6 months notice if he deems it necessary to meet the requirements of the Canada Pension Plan. Over



a period of time, the size of the fund will be determined by the levels of CPP contributions and benefits, the interest rate on loans, the rate of inflation and economic and population growth.

The fund has become an extremely important source of financing to the provinces. Therefore, the determination of the role of CPP benefits in meeting social policy objectives should be balanced by consideration of long-term provincial financing needs. It should be borne in mind that provincial borrowing from the CPP fund in itself has contributed significantly to social and economic policy objectives by providing needed capital for areas such as health, education and environment.

There are essentially two kinds of break-even points in any projected series of fund levels. One is from the point of view of a recipient or a potential recipient of CPP benefits and occurs when the fund is exhausted and can no longer finance benefits. Moderate inflation projections for the current plan indicate that this point will not be reached until the year 2020. Adoption of the federal proposals would move it back to the year 2007.

However, from the point of view of provincial cash flow, the break-even point occurs much earlier. It takes place when provincial interest payments, or interest and principal repayments exceed the amount of new capital funds available. Under the current plan, given the assumptions of moderate inflation and that all available funds will be borrowed, this point will occur in 1988. If the new proposals are accepted in total, this point will occur in 1982. In that year interest payments of \$973 million will exceed by \$11 million the amount of new capital funds available.

The following table shows the annual amount of CPP funds available for loans to provinces and the net provincial cash flow after netting out interest payments for the period 1972 to 1985.



PENSIM PROJECTIONS OF NET PROVINCIAL CASH FLOW UNDER THE CURRENT AND PROPOSED PLANS

(\$ million)

	Cu	rrent Plan	Proposed Plan							
Year	Interest	Net Provincial Cash Flow	Interest	Net Provincial Cash Flow						
1972 1973 1974	299 366 4 34	610 595 570	299 366 428	610 508 535						
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979	502 571 643 719 797	550 543 524 471 425	493 562 633 705 778	558 529 478 417 319						
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984	876 952 1,032 1,115 1,203	289* 284 254 227 161	849 910 972 1,035 1,097	96* 48 -10 -89 -180						
1985	1,291	134	1,156	-253						

^{*} A notch occurs in the projection of the years 1979 to 1980 as the PENSIM computational procedure is converted to a long-range method from a short-range method.

Early recall of loans is projected to begin in 1998 under the proposed plan. At this point the Minister of Finance will begin to recall loans before they reach maturity. Early recalls under the current plan would begin in 2010.

The first CPP loans become repayable in 1986. In that year and in subsequent years, therefore, the net provincial cash flow will be further reduced by the amount of loan repayments. The following table shows the projected net provincial cash flow for selected years after 1985.



PENSIM PROJECTIONS OF LOAN DITAGRADIS AND NET PROVINCIAL CASH FLOW UNDER THE CURRENT AND PROPOSED PLANS

(\$ million)

	Curr	ent Plan	Proposed Plan								
Year	Loan	Net Provincial	Loan	Net Provincial							
	Repayments	Cash Flow	Repayments	Cash Flow							
1936	383	108	383	-354							
1987	764	20	765	-459							
1938	719	- 61	719	-579							
1939	818	-172	818	-722							
1990	778	-273	778	-926							
1995	1,052	-895	1,051	-1,843							
2000	1,165	-1,578	1,953	-2,847							



V AMENDMENTS TO THE QUILL STORM

The 1970 white paper on income security and subsequent statements by the federal government have placed strong emphasis on maintaining total compatibility between the Canada and Quebec pension plans. In July 1972, Quebec passed an act to amend the QPP (Bill 24) which will take effect on January 1, 1973. These amendments do not parallel the federal proposals.

The major features of the Quebec amendments are:

- increase in YMPE to \$6,300 by 1975, compared with \$7,800 under the federal proposals;
- increase in ceiling in Pension Index from 2 per cent to 3 per cent;
- flat-rate benefits for widows' and disabled persons increased to \$80 per month (same as federal proposals) with earnings-related portion of 37 1/2 per cent for widows and 75 per cent for disabled, compared with 75 and 100 per cent in federal proposals
- . orphans' benefits will be frozen at \$29 per month in 1974;
- earnings test for pensioners aged 65-69 to be changed to a single offset rate of 50 per cent for any earnings exceeding the basic exemption;
- . the three-year waiting period for amendments has been eliminated:
- widows who do not qualify for QPP payments will receive equivalent benefits through social assistance, 50 per cent financed by the Quebec Pension Plan.

The Quebec amendments are significantly closer to the federal plan than the proposals which were originally outlined in the Castonguay Report. Generally, the main effect of the Quebec amendments is that initial retirement benefits will be about 22 per cent lower than those provided under the federal CPP proposals. However, they will be escalated at a higher rate since the Pension Index ceiling will be 3 per cent compared with 2 per cent under the federal proposals. For example, a CPP contributor retiring in 1976 on full benefits under the proposed plan would receive \$1,925 in his first retirement year compared with a QPP pension of \$1,584. By 1990 the initial \$341 difference would be narrowed to \$144.

^{1.} Government of Quebec, Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Health and Social Welfare (Quebec, 1971), Volume V, Tome II.



The following table compares the major benefit streams under the existing plan, the federal proposals and the Quebec plan.

CPP AND QPP MAXIMUM PROPOSED ANNUAL BENEFITS IN 1976 AND 1980

	the company of the last way of the last boundary to the last of the last boundary to the last	1976	
	Current	Proposed	Quebec Amendments
	\$	\$	\$
Retirement pension	1,467	1,925	1,584
Total Disability pension	1,459	2,944	2,232
Widow's pension	909	2,463	1,644
Orphan's pension	358	358	348
		1980	
Retirement pension	1,825	2,458	1,980
Total Disability pension	1,757	3,561	2,664
Widow's pension	1,072	2,946	1,920
Orphan's pension	388	388	348

The next table shows the effect of applying the Quebec amendments to the Canada Pension Plan. Although benefits are generally lower than those suggested by the federal government, the relatively lower YMPE and higher maximum in the Pension Index would result in a net impact on the CPP fund which is virtually identical to that of the federal proposals.



The effect of adopting the Quebec plan would be that the fund would reach a maximum level of \$17.9 billion in 1989 compared with a maximum of \$23.3 billion in 1993 under the federal proposals. From the provincial "cash flow" point of view, the turnaround point would occur in 1980.

PENSIM PROJECTIONS OF CPP FUND WITH QUEBEC AMENDMENTS

Year	Contributions (\$ million)	Benefits and Expenses (\$ million)	Fund at Year End (\$ billion)
1972	871	262	5.3
1973	929	416	6.3
1974	985	501	7.2
1975	1,104	614	8.2
1976	1,150	732	9.2
1977	1,237	886	10.2
1978	1,315	1,064	11.2
1979	1,420	1,269	12.1
1980	1,521	1,576	12.9
1985	2,297	2,744	16.4
1990	3,201	4,412	18.0
1995	4,408	6,684	14.5
2000	6,155	9,644	4.1
2002	7,049	11,091	0



APPENDIX A

Summary of Policy Issues



SUMMARY OF POLICY ISSUES

Earlier sections of this paper have provided an initial basis for developing a general policy concerning the role of the Canada Pension Plan with respect to both benefits and financing. This section summarizes these general issues and, in addition, cites the major specific issues which will be raised during discussions on the CPP.

General Issues

1. Retirement Benefits

The major issue concerns the relationship of CPP pension benefits to other income support programs for the elderly and the development and clarification of the specific objectives of the various programs.

2. Supplementary Benefits

The role of the CPP in providing survivor and disability benefits should be assessed in terms of the long-term social policy objectives in this field and in relation to the possible role of other existing or potential programs.

3. Early Retirement

A question of increasing importance, which is directly related to the above issues, concerns the provision of benefits to people under the age of 65. As the trend to early retirement increases, the delay of retirement income benefits until age 65 becomes increasingly arbitrary. Public retirement income policy will have to eventually take into account the group of people who are retiring early.

4. Provincial Finances

Policy in the above areas must be balanced by long-run provincial financing objectives and needs.



Specific Policy Issues

1. Increasing YMPE to \$7,800 in 1975

This action underlies the basic thrust of the federal amendments. It increases the amount of contributions and increases the earnings-related portions of all future pension benefits. The development of a policy position on this issue is directly related to an overall position on the size of all benefits and the method of financing. The proposed YMPE change reflects the federal policy of adjusting the YMPE in line with the average industrial wage in Canada.

2. Adjustment Indexes

The CPP currently uses two indexes to adjust contributions and benefits over time. The Earnings Index, which is based upon an eight-year moving average of Canadian wages and salaries, will be used to adjust the YMPE after 1975.

The Pension Index is used to annually adjust pension benefits which are paid to individuals. It permits a maximum increase of 2 per cent per year.

In light of the recent adoption of the Consumer Price

Index as the adjustment factor for Old Age Security and

Guaranteed Income Supplement payments, it may be consistent to extend the same provision to CPP benefits.

If this were done, the Earnings Index may also have to be adjusted to ensure that contributions keep pace with increased benefits.

3. Earnings Test

The existing plan provides that an earnings test be applied to retirement pension recipients aged 65 to 69. Payments are reduced by 50 per cent of earnings between 18 and 30 per cent of the YMPE, and by 100 per cent of



earnings over 30 per cent of the TMPE. For example in 1976 a person aged 65 entitled to full CFF benefits would receive no benefits if his income from salary or wages was \$4,000 or more.

The white paper suggests that this provision be reviewed with the provinces. Removal of the provision would strengthen the insurance aspect of the Canada Pension Plan. However, if the social welfare aspects of the plan are to be emphasized, the earnings test should remain and the same principle could be extended to other payments such as widows' benefits.

4. Relationship to Workmen's Compensation Benefits

Both the Canada Pension Plan and workmen's compensation benefits provide pensions for prolonged and/or total disability and both pay survivor benefits. Provincial workmen's compensation plans generally pay for industrial employees when the death or disability occurs from an on-the-job accident. The CPP provides total disability coverage to all classes of workers. Additional payments are made for children and, under the proposals, for wives as well.

Currently, there are no provisions for integration between the two plans and, therefore, it is possible for someone to collect maximum benefits under both. A policy for integrating and off-setting benefits should be developed within the context of the CPP review.

5. Contribution Rate

There is currently no proposal to increase the contribution rate but nevertheless it exists as a potential policy alternative in light of the proposed benefit increases.



6. Benefit Transition at Age 65

Under the current plan disability pensions end at age 65 and are revalued as a retirement pension. Since the YMPE will be higher, the new retirement pension will be greater than a reald in will pension. The revaluation will terminate benefits for children of such pensioners.

Under the federal proposals, no such transition would occur and the disability pension would continue beyond age 65, with a reduction equal to the OAS benefit. Thus, there is no upward revaluation, but children and wives of disability pensioners would continue to receive benefits.



APPENDIX B



Summary of Main Features of Current and Proposed Schemes

at below	Item	Current Scheme	Proposed Scheme
1. F	Pension Index	Average of consumer price indices of 12 months ending with June of the preceding year. Maximum of 1.02 of preceding year's Pension Index.	No change
E	Year's Maximum Yensionable Harnings	\$5,500 in 1972, escalated thereafter in line with Pension Index up to 1975. After 1975, escalated in line with Earnings Index.	Increase from \$5,500 in 1972 to \$6,300 in 1973, \$7,100 in 1974 and \$7,800 in 1975. Thereafter, escalated in line with Earnings Index.
	Year's Basic	12 per cent of year's maximum pensionable earnings, rounded down to the nearest \$100 (currently \$600). For the self-employed, it is the same figure as long as his earnings exceed 1.33 of that figure (currently \$800).	Maintain level of \$600 Self-employed to contribute on earnings above \$600 as long as his earnings exceed \$800.
	Earnings Index	Average of employee's average earnings for the eight years ending two years before the current year, divided by the corresponding average for the first eight years of the Canada Pension Plan.	No change
		Employees between the ages of 18 and 65 must contribute at the rate of earnings between the year's basic exemption and the year's maximum pensionable earnings. This is matched by the employer. The self-employed contribute at the rate of 3.6 per cent.	No change
	ension	Amount payable in initial year of retirement dependent upon the average of the ratios of contributor's pensionable earnings to the year's maximum pensionable earnings during his contributory period. This ratio is multiplied by 25 per cent of the average of the most recent three levels of the year's maximum pensionable earnings. After the initial year of retirement, it is escalated every year by the Pension Index.	No change
7. E		Retirement pensions, payable between the ages of 65 and 69, are offset at the rate of 50 per cent on other earnings in excess of 18 per cent of the year's maximum pensionable earnings for that year, and are fully offset on earnings in excess of 30 per cent.	To be reviewed.



8. Disability Pension

Whatemark consumer s. 1972) plus 75 per cent of retirement to be raised to \$80 pension contributor would have been entitled to, had he reached retire-ment age. After initial year com-bined amount is escalated every year by Pension Index. At age 65, the disabled pensioner is deemed to apply for a retirement pension which is revalued.

11.1.=11.11 (60,000) amn (in 1973) plus 100 per cent of retirement pension. At age 65, this total is reduced

9. Benefit to Children of Disabled Beneficiaries

Flat-rate payment of \$27.60 (in 1972) Payment not to be per month up to age 18, or 25 if still at school. This payment to be discontinued when father reaches 65 One-half of this amount to each child in excess of four. After initial year payment is escalated every year by Pension Index.

discontinued when father reaches 65.

10. Benefit to Wives of Disabled Beneficiaries

NONE

\$80 per month (in 1973) if she is under 65 and has dependent children in her care. Payment to be escalated every year by Pension Index.

11. Widow's and Disabled Widow's Pension

A full pension consisting of a flatrate payment of \$27.60 (in 1972) plus an earnings-related portion equal to 37.5 per cent of retirement pension husband would have been entitled to, had he reached retirement age, is payable to disabled widows, to widows with young children and to widows 45 or over. When widow reaches 65, however, she receives 60 per cent of husband's retirement pension in addition to her Old Age Security If widow is not disabled, payment. does not have dependent children and is between 35 and 45, her full pension is reduced by 1/120th for every month that her age is less than 45. After initial year combined amount is escalated every year by Pension Index.

The full pension to be raised to \$80 (in 1973) a month plus 75 per cent of husband's retirement pension. At age 65, this total is reduced by the OAS pay-

12. Disabled Widower's Pension

The same pension available to a disabled widow is paid to a disabled widower if he was dependent on his wife at the time of her death.

Same as 11

13. Orphan's Benefit

Flat-rate payment equal to \$27.61 (in 1972) payable to each of first four unmarried children of a deceased male contributor whether or not mother is alive. This amount is reduced by one-half for each child in excess of four. Payment discontinues when children reach 18, or 25 if still at school. Payment also payable to children of deceased female contributor who maintained them at time of her death. After initial year payment is escalated every year by Pension Index.

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	Item	Current Scheme	Proposed Scheme	
14.	Death Benefit	Lump sum payment, equal to six times the monthly retirement pension, is paid to the estate of a deceased contributor, provided such payment does not exceed 10 per cent of the year's maximum pensionable earnings in year of death.	No change	

1. In the case of a widow or a disabled widower who becomes entitled to the receipt of more than one pension, the total amount of benefits must not exceed 25 per cent of the average of the YMPE for the last three years, including the current year.



APPENDIX C



Derivation of Fund and Provincial Cash Flow

Chapter IV has set out the financing considerations of the Canada Pension Plan for the current and white paper alternatives.

This appendix outlines the interaction of contributions and benefits in deriving the fund level in any year, and the gross and net cash flows available to the participating provinces.

The accompanying tables show how the flow of capital through the Plan is channeled to provide investment funds for the provinces. Gross revenue to the fund comes from three sources:

- contributions of employees, employers and the selfemployed;
- provincial interest payments on the cumulative amount borrowed;
- repayments of principal as the loans mature; or, at the discretion of the Minister of Finance, subject to early recall as the funds are needed.

The gross revenue is then reduced by benefit payments and expenses of administration. The resulting net revenue is then available as investment capital to the participating provinces in that year.

While the amount of net revenue to the fund in each year is available to the provinces for investment purposes, the <u>actual</u> cash flow to the provinces is this figure, less provincial payments of interest and repayments of principal. Thus, even though the fund level itself may continue to rise, the net provincial cash flow may decline and become negative.



PENSIM PROJECTIONS OF FUND COMPONENTS UNDER THE CURRENT PLAN (CANADA LESS QUEBEC)

	t Net Provincial d Cash Flow			0/1									7.						2.0							0 620		200	
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PENSIM PROJECTIONS OF FUND COMPONENTS UNDER THE PROPOSED PLAN (CANADA LESS QUEBEC)

(\$ million)

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Net		874	. 0	05	1,091	1,110	1,122	1,097	945	958	962	976	917	903	1.244	1.581	1,475	1,480	1,271	1,206	10	600	777	. 4
Benefits and Expenses	260	484	581	707	825	986	1,174	1,394	1,757	1,970	2,197	2,449	2,728	3,089	3,396	3,724	4,087	4,480	4,942	5,374	5,839	788.9	6.867	776
Loan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	383	765	719	818	778	845	606	874	696	1,051
Interest	299	366	428	493	562	632	705	778	849	910	972	1,035	1,097	1,156	1,215	1,275	1,335	1,384	1,419	1,440	1,453	1,458	1,454	1,439
Contributions	870	992	1,116	1,265	1,354	1,464	1,591	1,713	1,853	2,018	2,187	2,360	2,548	2,836	3,042	3,265	3,508	3,758	4,016	4,295	4,585	4,900	5,227	5,598
Calendar	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995





